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NET NEUTRALITY, FULL THROTTLE:





Imagine making a telephone call to a friend. In the
middle of the conversation, unbeknownst to either of you, a
telephone operator joins the call. Mimicking each person's
voice, the operator separately informs you both that the call is
over and then severs the connection. While this situation
may seem too farfetched to generate any pressing concern, it
illustrates the actual behavior of a prominent broadband
Internet provider-Comcast Corporation.1
Comcast has long been a leading Internet Service
Provider, serving millions of people.2 In 2007, Internet users
were shocked when news broke that Comcast had
intentionally blocked subscribers from engaging in legal,
online file sharing.3 It soon became clear that Comcast had
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1. See In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against
Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications and
Broadband Industry Practices, 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 41 (2008) (mem. opinion
and order) [hereinafter Against Comcast]. Throughout this comment, I refer to
this order as the "Comcast Order."
2. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13
OR 15(D) OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 1-2 (2008),
http://www.comcast.com/2008annualreview/pdf/2008comcast10K.pdf.
3. See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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not only interfered with certain forms of Internet usage, but
also had done so in a way that disguised the cause of the
connection failures.4  Several parties lodged formal
complaints to the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC"), and in a written adjudication ("Comcast Order"), 5
the FCC officially found that Comcast had violated federal
communications policies.6
This August 2008 FCC order documented the first
instance in which the Commission formally found a
broadband provider to have violated principles of net
neutrality.7 The fact that Congress has neither enacted a
statute prohibiting certain broadband network management
practices nor enacted any statute empowering the FCC to
regulate such practices 8 prompted concern that the FCC's
actions lacked a statutory basis.' Despite a subsequent
proposal regarding net neutrality rules, the FCC has not yet
promulgated substantive or procedural rules directly
pertaining to these issues.'°
This comment will address the Comcast Order and argue
that the FCC lacks an effective policy for regulating and
4. See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
5. Against Comcast, supra note 1.
6. See infra notes 46-58 and accompanying text regarding formal
proceedings.
7. See Posting of Larry Dignan to ZDNet.com,
http://blogs.zdnet.com/BTL/?p=9530 (Aug. 1, 2008, 8:48 EST) (noting that the
ruling is "the first official one making network throttlirg blocking officially
illegal"). For a discussion of network neutrality, see discussion infra Part
II.B.4.
8. Comcast Files Petition for Review of FCC's Network Management
Practices Order, TECH. L.J., Sept. 4, 2008, http://www.techlawjournal.comI
topstories/2008/20080904.asp. But see infra notes 204-10 and accompanying
text for an explanation of proposed attempts at legislation.
9. See Opening Brief for Petitioner Comcast Corporation at 15-16,
Comcast Corp. v. FCC, No. 08-1291 (D.C. Cir. July 27, 2009); see also Petition
for Review and, in the Alternative, Notice of Appeal at 1, Comcast Corp. v.
FCC, No. 08-1291 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 2008), available at
http://static.arstechnica.com/Comcast%20Opening%20Briefo20(as%20filed).pdf
[hereinafter Petition for Review] (challenging the FCC's authority to regulate
network management practices).
10. See id. In October 2009, the FCC proposed draft rules governing
network neutrality. See Grant Gross, FCC Moves Toward Net Neutrality Rules,
PCWORLD, Dec. 30, 2009, http'//www.pcworld.com/article/185614/fcc moves_
toward net neutralityrules.html. The FCC has also opened the issue for
public comment and may soon decide whether to take further action. See id. As
discussed later in this comment, the FCC's proposal paves the way for further
agency rulings or legislative action.
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preventing future broadband network management disputes.
Part II of this comment examines the Comcast network
management dispute and resulting Comcast Order," as well
as case law creating the framework for regulating broadband
Internet service. 12  Part III addresses the legal issues
involved in the adjudication of the Comcast dispute. 13 Then,
Part III scrutinizes the rationale set forth in the Comcast
Order and challenges its legitimacy in light of the FCC's
uncertain statutory authority to regulate the provision of
broadband Internet services. 4 Finally, though the FCC may
have acted within its authority,15 Part IV proposes an
alternate mandatory disclosure and enforcement model that
would more clearly further the goals of the Comcast Order
and communications law as a whole. 16
II. BACKGROUND
Comcast Corporation, which serves over fourteen million
high-speed Internet customers, is a leading competitor in the
market for broadband cable systems. 7 The term "broadband"
is commonly used to describe a high-speed Internet
connection to an end user's home.18  Cable modem service
currently dominates the broadband Internet market, 19
allowing users to download information at speeds
significantly faster than those of traditional dial-up
modems.20
The Internet is a packet-switched network-messages
are broken into small packets of data, transferred, and then
11. See discussion infra Part II.A.
12. See discussion infra Part II.B.
13. See discussion infra Part III.A.
14. See discussion infra Part III.B-D.
15. See discussion infra Part III.B.
16. See discussion infra Part IV.
17. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 2.
18. See Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-To-End:
Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L.
REV. 925, 926-27 (2001). A consumer may receive broadband access by either
digital subscriber lines (DSL) or cable lines. Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC,
345 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003).
19. See INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV., WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU,
HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2007 tbl.2
(2008), http'/hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublicattachmatch/DOC-280906Al.pdf.
20. HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 180 (23d ed. 2007)
(defining broadband as "any circuit significantly faster than a dial-up phone
line").
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reassembled.21 Recent technological developments have
enabled Internet Service Providers ("ISPs"),22  such as
Comcast, to examine data packets and learn about the
content transmitted over their networks.23  One such
development, called "deep packet inspection," allows an ISP
to scan (or "sniff') Internet traffic through instantaneous data
examination.24 With this information, ISPs can customize
services to cater more closely to the needs of specific end
users and content creators. 25  Some Internet consumers-
often the users of peer-to-peer ("P2P") software,26 Internet
telephone calls, 27 and gaming software 21-may be willing to
pay a premium for faster, better, and smarter access to
content.29 Deep packet inspection allows ISPs to prioritize
21. Kevin Werbach, Only Connect, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1251
(2007). This type of transmission operates on a "best efforts" basis, with no
guarantee that a packet will reach its destination. Id. Thus, networks seeking
to offer enhanced delivery are often willing to provide additional capacity or to
pay for overlaps that will facilitate transmission. Id. at 1275.
22. ISPs are traditionally divided into three categories: backbone providers,
regional ISPs, and last-mile providers. Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality,
Consumers, and Innovation, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179, 195 (2008). Yoo further
states:
Backbone providers occupy the center of the network and offer high-
speed transport between locations spread throughout the country.
Regional ISPs carry traffic from network access points served by
backbone providers to the local distribution facilities maintained by
last-mile providers ....
Id. (footnote omitted). Last-mile providers (such as Comcast) supply the final
connection, carrying traffic to end users. Id.
23. See Rob Frieden, Internet Packing Sniffing and Its Impact on the
Network Neutrality Debate and the Balance of Power Between Intellectual
Property Creators and Consumers, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 633, 636-37 (2008).
24. See id. at 641-42.
25. See id.
26. Peer-to-peer file sharing networks facilitate the exchange of files among
individual users. Yoo, supra note 22, at 190. Files in this architecture are not
stored in centralized locations, but are instead distributed across the network.
Id. Unlike the distribution of infringing materials over the web, which is
identifiable, P2P distribution of infringing materials is difficult to control since
the network architecture is distributed. See id. at 190, 193, 205.
27. Software facilitating such communication is often referred to as Voice
over Internal Protocol ("VoIP"). This technology offers voice communications
capabilities using packet switched Internet. See Robert M. Frieden, Dialing for
Dollars: Should the FCC Regulate Internet Telephony?, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER
& TECH. L.J. 47, 53-55 (1997).
28. See Frieden, supra note 23, at 641.
29. Id. (noting that ISPs do so by engaging in vertical integration of various
aspects of the provision of Internet content). These individuals are generally
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traffic into different tiers, and to therefore apply different fees
and "quality of service" commitments."
Deep packet inspection, however, has also made it
possible for ISPs to discriminate against certain types of
Internet traffic under the guise of managing network
congestion." 1 Cable modem networks are shared networks,
meaning that traffic generated by individual customers
shares bandwidth with the traffic generated by neighbors.2
Because the transmission speed available to a single end user
over a cable network decreases as the number of total users
increases,33 ISPs use differing techniques to manage network
congestion. 4 Some ISPs, however, have used congestion as a
proxy for "content-throttling," essentially blocking or slowing
the speed at which content is shared over the Internet.35
A. Comcast Accused of "Secretly Degrading" Peer-to-Peer
Applications
In 2007, several Comcast subscribers noticed problems
while using BitTorrent 36 and other file-sharing technologies. 7
candidates for premium service since they often have higher bandwidth
requirements, lower tolerance for dropped or delayed data transmission, and
more traffic volume than typical users. See id. at 642.
30. See id. at 637, 639. A "quality of service" commitment explains a
provider's standards of customer service.
31. See id. at 643-44.
32. Yoo, supra note 22, at 201. The ultimate amount of congestion created
also depends, however, on the timing of network usage. See id. at 206.
33. See Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced
Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely
Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section
706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 17 F.C.C.R. 2844 app. B 21 (2002)
[hereinafter Pursuant to Section 706].
34. Yoo, supra note 22, at 202-04. For instance, if a router (used to
transmit data) detects congestion, it may either de-prioritize packets (thus
delaying transmission) or drop them entirely. Frank Pasquale, Internet
Nondiscrimination Principles: Commercial Ethics for Carriers and Search
Engines, U. CI. LEGAL F. 263, 270 (2008).
35. See Dina R. Richman, The Shot Heard Round the World Wide Web:
Comcast Violates Net Neutrality, 20 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 17, 17-18
(2008).
36. The term "BitTorrent" refers to a company as well as a protocol. See
Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast
Corporation For Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, at 5 (F.C.C.
2007), available at httpJ/www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/fppkcomcast_
complaint.pdf [hereinafter Complaint of Free Press]. Initially, BitTorrent
developed as an open-source protocol for cheaply and quickly distributing large
files. Id. BitTorrent, Inc. was founded by the original inventor of the
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As these complaints began to receive press attention, a
spokesperson for Comcast disclaimed any responsibility for
the problems, stating "we don't throttle any traffic."38 After
performing a series of nationwide tests, the Associated Press
reported that Comcast actively interfered with subscriber
attempts to share files online, that this interference affected
all types of traffic, and that it had a "drastic effect" on certain
traffic.3 9 The report further indicated that "the method used
by Comcast was difficult to circumvent" because it involved
the falsifying of network traffic.4 ° When a BitTorrent user
attempted to share files via a Transmission Control Protocol
("TCP") connection, 4' Comcast's servers sent each computer a
reset packet that appeared to come from the other's computer,
effectively terminating the connection.42  Former FCC
Chairman Kevin J. Martin analogized the problem to mail
delivery:
Would it be OK if the post office opened your mail, decided
they didn't want to bother delivering it, and hid that fact
by sending it back to you stamped "address unknown-
return to sender"? Or would it be OK, when someone
sends you a first class-stamped letter, if the post office
opened it, decided that because the mail truck is full
sometimes, letters to you could wait, and then hid both
that they read your letters and delayed them?43
BitTorrent protocol in order to offer products and services, including licensed
movie downloads. Id.
37. Against Comcast, supra note 1, 6.
38. Id.
39. Id. 7.
40. Id. 8. A separate but related problem was that Comcast's reset
packets resembled messages sent by one or both of the users' computers, and
many states make it illegal for an individual to impersonate another individual
with intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or defraud another. See Richman,
supra note 35, at 18.
41. When an Internet user opens a webpage, sends an e-mail, or shares a
document, the user's computer generally establishes a connection with another
computer using Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). Against Comcast, supra
note 1, 3 (citing INFORMATION SCIENCES INST., RFC 793: TRANSMISSION
CONTROL PROTOCOL (1981), http://tools.ietf.org/htmlrfc793).
42. Id. (noting that when computers connect via TCP, each computer
monitors the connection and if either detects a problem, it sends a "reset packet"
or "RST packet" to the other, "signaling that the connection should be
terminated and a new one should be established").
43. Against Comcast, supra note 1, at 13065 (statement of Chairman Kevin
J. Martin). Shortly after the Comcast Order was issued, Julius Genachowski
took Martin's place as Chairman.
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Studies later revealed that Comcast had used deep
packet inspection to target and disconnect customers who
uploaded files using BitTorrent and other P2P protocols.44
Comcast initially claimed that it only sent reset packets
during periods of network congestion, but later admitted to
extensive intrusion after evidence emerged showing that the
interference occurred at all times and regardless of the
amount of network traffic.45
On November 1, 2007, two interest groups, Free Press
46
and Public Knowledge,47 filed a formal complaint with the
FCC, alleging that Comcast secretly degraded subscriber use
of P2P applications by interfering with network traffic.4"
Free Press also filed a petition for a declaratory ruling, asking
the FCC to clarify that an ISP violates the FCC's Internet
Policy Statement when it intentionally degrades a targeted
Internet application.49
In a three-to-two decision issued August 1, 2008,50 the
FCC found that Comcast had overstepped its network
44. See id. 41 (noting a study that identified instances in which Comcast's
packet forgery prevented the transfer of data).
45. See id. 9.
46. Free Press is a national nonprofit organization that works to increase
informed public participation in media policy debates. Complaint of Free Press,
supra note 36, at 1-2.
47. Public Knowledge is a group dedicated to fortifying and defending a
vibrant information commons. Id. This group monitors proposed legislation
and policy that relates to intellectual property or technology, and engages in
debate on these issues. Id.
48. Id. at 1-2, 5; see also Against Comcast, supra note 1, 1 10. Free Press
sought, among other remedies, a permanent injunction to redress society's "loss
of unpredictable innovation," "encourage innovation in Internet applications
and content," and "promot[e] the deployment and uptake of high-speed Internet
access." Complaint of Free Press, supra note 36, at 32-33.
49. Petition for Declaratory Ruling of Free Press et al., No. 07-52, at iii
(F.C.C. 2007), available at httpJ/www.fcc.gov/broadband-network_
managementlfp_et al nn declaratory ruling.pdf. Other parties have also
lodged civil suits alleging breach of contract and false advertising. See, e.g.,
Complaint at 9 8-9, 14-15, Hart v. Comcast of Alameda, No. C 07-06350
PJH (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2007) (PG 07355993), available at
http://blogs.pcworld.com/staffblog/archives/HARTvCOMCAST.pdf.
50. The FCC issued its ruling in spite of a March 27, 2008 agreement
between Comcast and BitTorrent, in which both parties agreed there was no
need for government intervention. Comcast and BitTorrent Reach Accord on
Network Management Practices, TECH. L.J., Mar. 27, 2008,
http://www.techlawjournal.com/topstories/2008/20080327b.asp. The Order also
followed Comcast's April 15, 2008 announcement of an industry-wide effort to
discuss processes and practices for the management of P2P applications. Id.
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management authority by blocking BitTorrent traffic. 51
"[Tihe company's discriminatory and arbitrary practice
unduly squelche[d] the dynamic benefits of an open and
accessible Internet and [did] not constitute reasonable
network management."52  The FCC also found that
"Comcast's failure to disclose [its] practice . .. compounded
the harm."53  In addition, the FCC adopted a flexible
framework for evaluating future network management
disputes.54 This framework considers the legality of the
content accessed, whether the management practices have
been disclosed, and, if legal content has been arbitrarily
blocked or degraded, whether such practice was reasonable.5 5
The FCC also instituted a plan to halt Comcast's
"unreasonable" conduct.56 This plan required Comcast to
disclose the details of its network management practices
within thirty days, 57 to "submit a compliance plan describing
how it intended to stop such ... practices," and to disclose the
details of the practices it intended to deploy following
termination of its unreasonable practices.58  Comcast
subsequently filed a complaint against the FCC in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
challenging the basis of the FCC ruling in the absence of pre-
existing, legally enforceable standards.59
B. Regulation of High-Speed Internet Access
The Communications Act of 1934 ("the Act" or "the
51. See Against Comcast, supra note 1, 1. Former Chairman Kevin
Martin and Democrat Commissioners Michael Copps and Jonathan Adelstein
issued statements in support of the ruling, while Republican Commissioners
Deborah Taylor Tate and Robert M. McDowell dissented, finding the ruling to
constitute undue government intervention. See generally id.
52. Id. 1.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 13065 (statement of Chairman Kevin J. Martin).
55. Id. 11.
56. See id. The FCC, however, did not fine Comcast for its behavior. Id.
57. Against Comcast, supra note 1, 1 1.
58. Id.
59. Opening Brief for Petitioner Comcast Corporation, supra note 9, at 15.
Comcast also filed petitions for review of the Comcast Order in the Second,
Third, and Ninth Circuits and, pursuant to an order of the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation, those petitions were consolidated. Id. at v. The
District of Columbia Circuit terminated the consolidation on April 1, 2009. Id.
The D.C. Circuit will soon rule on statutory authority in the Comcast matter,
and it appears that it may disagree with the foregoing conclusions.
576 [Vol:50
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Communications Act")60 grants the FCC broad authority to
regulate interstate and foreign communication by wire or
radio, in order to make available an adequate and accessible
61Thnationwide communication service. The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("the 1996 Act"), which
amended the Communications Act, provides for promotion of
competition and reduction of regulation in the
telecommunications industry, in order to secure lower prices
and higher quality services and to encourage the rapid
deployment of new technology.62 Because broadband Internet
represents a hybrid form of communication, regulatory
history has addressed broadband in the context of both
communications laws.
1. Broadband Technology as a Form of "Advanced
Telecommunications"
Cable modem services are transmitted along the same
coaxial cable used to transmit television signals,63 which may
be upgraded to enable high speed broadband service.'
Neither Congress nor the FCC defines broadband in terms of
a specific technology.65 The FCC refers to broadband as a
form of "advanced telecommunications,"66 using this term to
describe services and facilities with a downstream (provider
to customer) transmission speed of more than 768 kilobits per
second to end users.67
60. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-614 (2006).
61. Id. §§ 151, 154(i).
62. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 216, 607-09 (2006).
63. See Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003).
64. See Nirali Patel, Comment, FCC Broadband Policy: More Power for the
Bell Monopolies, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 393, 400 (2003). Broadband connectivity
thus combines pure transmission capabilities of carrier networks with data
processing capabilities of the Internet. Werbach, supra note 21, at 1268.
65. See Patel, supra note 64, at 399.
66. See In re Development of National Broadband Data to Evaluate
Reasonable and Timely Deployment of Advanced Services to All Americans,
Improvement of Wireless Broadband Subscribership Data, and Development of
Data on Interconnected Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) Subscribership, 23
F.C.C.R. 9691, 1 (2008) (discussing development of broadband policies in
response to the Telecommunications Act mandate to deploy "'advanced
telecommunications capability' ").
67. Id. $ 20, n.66.
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2. Agency Rulings Underlying the Regulation of High-
Speed Internet Access
Although both cable modem service and digital
subscriber line technology ("DSL") provide high-speed
Internet access, differences in network structure cause them
to be governed under different schemes based on whether a
service is telephone based or cable based.68  Under the
Communications Act, telephone companies are considered
"common carriers" regulated under Title II, whereas cable
operators are regulated separately under Title VI.69 In a
series of proceedings in the 1960s called "The Computer
Inquiries," the FCC sought to determine a regulatory
approach to accommodate an era of integrated services and
convergence.70
In the first proceeding, commonly referred to as
"Computer I,"71 the FCC found data processing (such as
calculating numbers in a spreadsheet) to be a highly
competitive industry for which government regulation was
unnecessary.7 2 In contrast, the FCC viewed the market for
communications services (such as transmission of information
via e-mail) to be a monopoly and therefore decided to regulate
communications services as common carrier offerings under
Title II of the Communications Act.73 Services that combined
communications and data processing were deemed "hybrid"
services to be classified on a case-by-case basis.74
68. See Tramanh Phi, Comment, Duopolies, Restrictions, and Content
Regulation: How Much Access Are We Really Getting from Broadband Internet
Access?, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 347, 352-53 (2007).
69. See generally 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-614 (2006).
70. See infra notes 71-83 and accompanying text regarding the Computer
Inquiries. Convergence is the transition from analog to digital delivery of data
and network traffic, resulting in layered networks. See Werbach, supra note 21,
at 1262-64.
71. In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence
of Computer and Communication Services and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 11
(1971) (final decision and order) [hereinafter Computer].
72. Id. "Data processing" is the use of the computer for operations that
include storing, retrieving, sorting, merging, and calculating data, according to
programmed instruction. See In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented
by the Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services and
Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, % 15 (1970) (tentative decision).
73. Computer, supra note 71, 11. By nature of its technology, the
telephone was believed by many to operate most efficiently as a monopoly
controlled by a single entity.
74. Id. 27.
578 [Vol:50
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In "Computer II," 7 the FCC established a new regulatory
framework that distinguished between "basic services" and
"enhanced services."76 It defined basic services as "the
common carrier offering of transmission capacity for the
movement of information," such as telephone service.77
Enhanced services combined a basic service with an
enhancement such as computer processing or storage
service. 71 Basic services were thereafter regulated under
Title II, whereas enhanced services fell outside the scope of
Title II and were thus unregulated.79 Under this framework,
incumbent local exchange carriers ("ILECs"), such as common
carriers, were subject to substantial federal regulation when
providing broadband services.,o To protect against
anticompetitive behavior, the FCC subjected "facilities-based"
common carriers to an unbundling requirement, ordering
them to provide basic transmission services underlying their
enhanced services on a nondiscriminatory basis.8 " Computer
II also imposed "structural separation" safeguards that
required basic telecommunications carriers offering enhanced
services to do so through a separate corporate subsidiary. 2
75. In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 5 (1980) [hereinafter Amendment of Section
64.702].
76. Id. %1 86, 96-97 (defining "basic services" as the offering of a "pure
transmission capability over a communications path that is virtually
transparent in terms of its interaction with customer supplied information," and
an enhanced service as "any offering over the telecommunications network
which is more than a basic transmission service").
77. Id. 93.
78. Id. 97. Enhanced services were those "offered over common carrier
transmission facilities used in interstate communications, which employ
computer processing applications that act on the format, content, code, protocol,
or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted information; provide the
subscriber additional, different, or restructured information; or involve
subscriber interaction with stored information." 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (2008).
79. Amendment of Section 64.702, supra note 75, 5-7, 132 (concluding
that such regulation is unnecessary because it is not required by statute, is
contrary to public interest, and would not lead to regulatory certainty).
80. Id. % 132 (noting the FCC's power to control prices, terms, and
conditions offered by ILECs).
81. Id. %T 116-18, 149 (also noting elsewhere in the order that "facilities-
based" carriers are those that own basic transmission facilities). This
unbundling requirement-from which AT&T was specifically exempted-was
intended to limit abuse of market power through the controlled access to and
use of underlying transmission facilities in a discriminatory and anticompetitive
manner. See id. % 148-50, 154-56.
82. Id. %% 140-41, 159-60.
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The subsequent "Computer III" proceeding replaced this
structural separation requirement with nonstructural
safeguards designed to give all enhanced service providers
nondiscriminatory access to network facilities.83
When it passed the 1996 Act, in part to accommodate the
emergence of new Internet technologies, Congress preserved
the Computer II scheme distinguishing regulated basic
services from unregulated enhanced services, yet renamed
them "telecommunications services" and "information
services," respectively.84  In 2005, the FCC issued an
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet
over Wireline Facilities ("Wireline Broadband Order"), which
categorized the provision of wireline broadband service as an
information service.8 5  This order also noted that the
Computer Inquiry requirements should no longer be imposed
on facilities-based carriers in their provision of wireline
broadband Internet access service. 6
3. Case Law Underlying Regulation of High-Speed
Internet Access
Given that the FCC did not explicitly classify cable
modem service following the development of new
technologies, 7 federal courts have also played a role in the
regulation of high-speed Internet access. Under the 1996 Act,
local governments were able to regulate cable services for the
purpose of preserving competition.88 Yet the Ninth Circuit, in
83. See In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations, 104 F.C.C.2d 958, [[ 3-4 (1986). These nonstructural safeguards
included modification to network disclosure rules, nondiscrimination in
providing network services, and variations in accounting procedures. Id. 36.
84. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 153(20), 153(46) (2006).
85. In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over
Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R 14853, 169 (2005) (report and order and notice
of proposed rulemaking) [hereinafter Wireline Facilities].
86. See id. 41. Yet the classification of DSL service as telecommunications
(and not a telecommunications service subject to Title II regulation) has been
criticized. See, e.g., Patel, supra note 64, at 409 (noting flawed distinction
between providing and using telecommunications).
87. See discussion supra Part II.B.2 regarding agency rulings as to high-
speed Internet.
88. See 47 U.S.C. § 533(d)(2) (2006) (noting that "[niothing in this section
shall be construed to prevent any State or franchising authority from
prohibiting the ownership or control of a cable system in a jurisdiction by any
person . . . in circumstances in which the State or franchising authority
determines that the acquisition of such a cable system may eliminate or reduce
580 [Vol:50
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AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland,89 found that cable modem
service was not a "cable service," but rather a hybrid
service-partly an information service and partly a
telecommunications service.9" The FCC later sought to
modify this categorization, instead classifying cable modem
service as an interstate information service with no separate
offering of telecommunications service. 9' In so ruling, the
FCC sought to bring cable modem Internet service within its
jurisdiction as an information service, which had not
previously been subject to regulation.92  Nonetheless, in
Brand X Internet Services v. FCC, the Ninth Circuit vacated
this finding, reaffirming a hybrid characterization of cable
modem service and subjecting cable companies to open-access
rules that typically governed the telephone industry.93
The FCC and numerous parties, including the National
Cable and Telecommunications Association ("NCTA"),
challenged the Brand X decision.94 These parties argued that
subjecting cable modem service to common carrier regulation
would stifle the investment, innovation, and broadband
deployment that was necessary to the economy. 95  The
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and, in
National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X
Internet Services,96 overturned the Ninth Circuit's ruling.97
The Court upheld the FCC's categorization of cable
competition in the delivery of cable service in a jurisdiction").
89. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).
90. See id. at 876-78.
91. In re High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities,
17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 1$ 56-58 (2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of proposed
rulemaking).
92. Id. 59.
93. Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003).
94. See id. at 1131-32.
95. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18-19, Nat. Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n
v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (No. 04-277), 2004 WL 1944011.
96. Nat. Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, 545 U.S. 967. The small Internet
company Brand X argued that cable companies, like phone companies, should
be required to share their lines with third-party broadband providers. Id. at
995-97. The Court, however, sided with the FCC in upholding the cable
companies' practice of excluding most third-party broadband providers from
their networks. Id.
97. Id. at 980. The Court held that the Ninth Circuit should have used a
Chevron framework, whereby statutory ambiguities may be interpreted and
resolved by an agency if that statute is within the agency's jurisdiction and the
agency's interpretation is reasonable. Id. at 981-82 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
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broadband service as an information service, noting that the
mere fact that a cable company offers an information service
in the form of Internet access does not mean that it also offers
the high-speed data transmission (telecommunications) to
provide this service. 98  While the Court exercised authority
under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction, 99 it refrained from
offering detailed analysis in this regard. 00 Most importantly,
the Court stated generally that such jurisdiction allows the
FCC to impose additional regulatory obligations on
information service providers' and special regulatory duties
on facilities-based ISPs. 10 2  Nonetheless, because cable
modem Internet access service has been characterized as an
information service, it has remained free from government
regulation. 0 3
4. The Network Neutrality Debate
a. Concepts of Network Neutrality
This regulatory climate for broadband has provided ISPs
the flexibility to inspect Internet content in furtherance of
innovation and user-specific tailoring. 0 4 Such developments,
however, have also fueled an ongoing debate over network
neutrality-the notion that all like Internet content should be
treated alike.' 0
98. Id. at 994.
99. See discussion infra Part III.A.1 (analyzing the FCC's ancillary
jurisdiction under Title I).
100. Nat. Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, 545 U.S. at 996 (noting that it "remains
free to impose special regulatory duties on facilities-based ISPs under its Title I
ancillary jurisdiction"); id. at 1002 ("Any inconsistency between the order under
review and the Commission's treatment of DSL service can be adequately
addressed when the Commission fully reconsiders its treatment of DSL service
and when it decides whether, pursuant to its ancillary Title I jurisdiction, to
require cable companies to allow independent ISPs access to their facilities.").
101. Id. at 976.
102. Id. at 996.
103. Patel, supra note 64, at 408. It is possible, however, that the categories
of telecommunications services and information services are becoming
"anachronistic in a [converged] world" because the lines between services are
increasingly blurred. See Werbach, supra note 21, at 1266.
104. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text regarding developments
in broadband technology.
105. See Yoo, supra note 22, at 180; see also Tim Wu, Network Neutrality,
Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141, 145 (2003).
It is important to note, however, that the term "net neutrality" is often conflated
with various other meanings. Compare Declan McCullagh, Net Neutrality
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One particularly innovative feature of the Internet is its
ability to transmit data from any application and to permit
applications to correspond without any changes to the
networks transporting data. 106 Those who support net
neutrality fear that network providers may use new
technology to harm or exclude certain applications and
content, thus decreasing innovation and reducing the
Internet's value for society.' °7 Net neutrality rules would
essentially "prevent [broadband] providers from excluding
applications or content from their networks or from
discriminating against them." l08
Though the idea of network neutrality has existed for
some time, the debate emerged more fully when the FCC
categorized many broadband platforms as "information
services," 109 thus removing common carrier protection without
implementing new regulation in its place."0 This issue has
also resurfaced recently amid the emerging duopoly among
DSL and cable modem providers,"' the poor performance of
the U.S. broadband market, 112 new technologies," 3 and an
increasing focus (by providers and by regulators) on the policy
issues relating to discriminatory network management
Advances on Capitol Hill, CNET NEWS, Apr. 4, 2006,
http://news.cnet.com/Republicans-defeat-Net-neutrality-proposa/2100-1028_3-
6058223.html?tag=mncol;txt (addressing net neutrality as the idea that
government should not forcibly prevent broadband providers from favoring
some connection speeds over others), with Amit M. Schejter & Moran Yemini,
Justice, and Only Justice, You Shall Pursue: Network Neutrality, the First
Amendment, and John Rawls' Theory of Justice, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 137, 172 (2007) (noting that "[nietwork neutrality is about ensuring that
physical scarcity in access to the Internet . . . does not limit the abundance of
content").
106. See generally Lemley & Lessig, supra note 18, at 930-33 (noting that the
idea of nondiscrimination among applications has facilitated innovation).
107. See Brett M. Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality
and the Economics of an Information Superhighway: A Reply to Professor Yoo,
47 JURIMETRICS J. 383, 387-88 (2007); Yoo, supra note 22, at 181.
108. Frischmann & van Schewick, supra note 107, at 389. Professor Yoo has
posited that allowing some degree of non-neutrality across a network "may
actually benefit consumers and promote innovation" through added competition.
Yoo, supra note 22, at 182.
109. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
110. Werbach, supra note 21, at 1266.
111. See infra notes 215, 219-23 and accompanying text characterizing the
broadband market.
112. See infra notes 226-28 and accompanying text.
113. See Yoo, supra note 22, at 187 (referring to online video applications).
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practices. 114  Following an October 2009 FCC proposal and
renewed public discussion regarding formal net neutrality
rules, the debate continues. 115
b. A Lack of Formal Network Neutrality Policies
Although the principles of net neutrality have not been
codified," 6 the Communications Act sets forth two principles
of nondiscrimination. First, the Act describes a national
Internet policy "to preserve the vibrant and competitive free
market that presently exists for the Internet" and "to promote
the continued development of the Internet."" 7 Further, the
Act charges the FCC with encouraging broadband
deployment "to all Americans" on a reasonable and timely
basis. 118
In an Internet Policy Statement issued along with its
2005 Wireline Broadband Order," 9 the FCC also "adopted"
four principles in an effort to ensure that broadband networks
are "widely deployed, affordable, and accessible to all
consumers." 20 These principles acknowledge that customers
are entitled to: (1) "access the lawful Internet content of their
choice," (2) "run applications and use services of their choice,"
(3) "connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the
network," and (4) "competition among network providers,
application and service providers, and content providers."' 2 '
The FCC vowed to incorporate such principles into its
ongoing policymaking activities, 22 yet conceded that these
114. See Werbach, supra note 21, at 1270.
115. See Gross, supra note 10.
116. Comcast Files Petition, supra note 8. Congress is reportedly pushing for
legislation, yet none of the proposals have garnered enough support to become
law. See also infra notes 204-206 and accompanying text for an explanation of
these proposals.
117. In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over
Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986, 2 (2005) [hereinafter Appropriate
Framework] (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1) (2006)).
118. 47 U.S.C. § 157 (2006); see also infra notes 163-66 and accompanying
text.
119. See supra note 85 and discussion infra Part III.A.2.a regarding the
Wireline Broadband Order and enforceability of the Internet Policy Statement.
120. Appropriate Framework, supra note 117, 4.
121. Id.
122. Id. 91 5.
The Commission has a duty to preserve and promote the vibrant and
open character of the Internet as the telecommunications marketplace
enters the broadband age. To foster creation, adoption and use of
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were not "rules" and were subject to reasonable
network management.'23 This Internet Policy Statement
presumptively applies to wireless broadband. 124  While these
measures seem to acknowledge broadband discrimination as
a legitimate worry, the FCC has refrained from adopting
enforceable mandates. 1
25
III. ANALYSIS OF THE COMCAST ORDER AND
RESULTING REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY
Though many have lauded the Comcast Order as a
landmark step in preserving the open Internet, 126 the FCC's
intervention into the Comcast dispute seems inconsistent
with its usual abstention from the regulation of information
services.127  By acting in absence of pre-existing standards
governing broadband network management, the FCC may
have exceeded statutory authority. 128 Moreover, by adopting
a highly discretionary approach to network management
issues, the FCC has taken a regulatory position that may
allow for largely unguided regulatory action. Such an
outcome, even if exercised under proper jurisdiction, may
Internet broadband content, applications, services and attachments,
and to ensure consumers benefit from the innovation that comes from
competition, the Commission will incorporate the above principles into
its ongoing policymaking activities.
Id.
123. Id. n.15; see also Opening Brief for Petitioner Comcast Corporation,
supra note 9, at 15 (arguing that the Policy Statement was, at the time of the
dispute, widely understood not to impose binding legal norms).
124. Marvin Ammori, Policy Statements, Rules, and Wireless Carterfone,
Address at the Santa Clara University School of Law Symposium on Carterfone
and Open Access in the Digital Era (Oct. 17, 2008). This is apparent in the
FCC's deregulation orders for cable modem, DSL, broadband, and wireless, as
well as in portions of the Comcast Order that refer to the Internet Policy
Statement. Id.
125. See Werbach, supra note 21, at 1272.
126. These parties include the Future of Music Coalition (FMC), Public
Knowledge, the Computer and Communications Industry Association, and Free
Press.
127. See discussion supra Part II.B.2 regarding the historical regulation of
broadband Internet access.
128. See discussion infra Part III.B. Comcast has cast this problem as a
violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. Specifically, Comcast has
asserted that it was sanctioned for conduct made unlawful on the basis of a
"fictional claim, an unknown process for the resolution of that claim, an ever-
evolving theory of liability against which to defend, and a 'high' burden of proof
that it did not know it was required to meet." Opening Brief for Petitioner
Comcast Corporation, supra note 9, at 16.
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warrant a new model for ensuring reasonable network
practices.
A. The Possible Breach of Statutory Authority
To properly adjudicate a proceeding such as the Comcast
dispute, the FCC must have jurisdiction pursuant to a
substantive provision of the Communications Act.129 The
FCC's characterization of broadband Internet access as an
information service, however, precludes the FCC from
regulating under Title II.1'3 Because Title VI (pertaining to
Cable Operators) has not yet been found to directly cover
broadband Internet providers, Title I remains the only
possible substantive authority for jurisdiction.'31 Thus, in its
issuance of the Comcast Order, the FCC relied upon its
general authority arising under Title 1.132
1. Title I Ancillary Jurisdiction
Title I of the Communications Act includes a general
grant of rulemaking authority, stating that "[tihe FCC may
perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations,
and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as
may be necessary in the execution of its functions." 3 ' Thus,
protecting the effectiveness of existing regulations issued
under the Communications Act is an appropriate exercise of
Title I ancillary jurisdiction.3 4  Despite the differences
between broadband Internet and the traditional services
covered by substantive titles of the Act, this discretion allows
the FCC some leeway to regulate services falling outside of
129. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (creating a Federal Communications
Commission which "shall execute and enforce the provisions of this [Act]").
130. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
131. Title III (47 U.S.C. §§ 301-399(b) (2006)) governs radio communications,
while Title IV (47 U.S.C. §§ 401-416 (2006)) and Title V (47 U.S.C. §§ 501-510
(2006)) set forth procedural, administrative, and penal provisions.
132. See Against Comcast, supra note 1, 14 (citing § 4(i) authority to
impose regulatory obligations on ISPs under Title I ancillary jurisdiction).
133. 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2006); see also id. § 303(r) (authorizing the FCC to,
"as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires . . . prescribe such
restrictions and conditions ... as may be necessary to carry out the provisions
of this [Act]").
134. See Dan G. Barry, Comment, The Effect of Video Franchising Reform on
Net Neutrality: Does the Beginning of IP Convergence Mean That It is Time for
Net Neutrality Regulation?, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 421,
441 (2008).
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those titles.'35
Nonetheless, the extent of the FCC's Title I authority
remains unsettled. 13 6  For instance, the Title I grant of
authority may be no more than a "housekeeping authority"
for setting rules of internal procedure. 137  Recent cases have
construed this ancillary authority narrowly, recognizing
jurisdiction only where its action is "ancillary to" the
furtherance of other regulatory authority. 138 In other words,
jurisdiction exists where it is "necessary to protect [a]
common carrier, broadcast, or cable regulation."139 This may
authorize regulation of ISPs in cases where the Internet
service competes with a traditional service, 140 but such a
result conflicts with the goals of the 1996 Act, which urged a
removal of Title I authority where new competition proves it
unnecessary. 141
2. Provisions to Which Regulation of the Comcast Dispute
May Be Ancillary
The FCC contended that Title I directly governed the
Comcast dispute because P2P connections are a form of
"communication by wire" over which the Commission retains
broad authority. 142 The FCC also maintained that its exercise
135. The Supreme Court has confirmed this flexibility, recognizing the FCC's
jurisdiction to impose additional regulatory obligations on information services
and to impose special regulatory duties on facilities-based ISPs under Title I.
Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1129 (9th Cir. 2003).
136. See James B. Speta, FCC Authority to Regulate the Internet: Creating It
and Limiting It, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 15, 17, 22 (2003).
137. See id. Professor Speta further states:
The Communications Act's substantive provisions and the FCC's
regulatory authority cover only three specific types of communications
services: (1) interstate common carriers under Title II, (2) spectrum
licenses under Title III, and (3) cable operators under Title VI. Indeed,
each of these Titles provides the FCC a grant of legislative rulemaking
authority. If the section 4(i) grant of authority included legislative
rulemaking, then the specific inclusion of these other substantive
grants would be redundant.
Id. at 23-24 (citing Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn T. Watts, Agency Rules with
the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 517-19
(2002) (footnotes omitted)).
138. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 706-09 (1979).
139. See Speta, supra note 136, at 25. That is, even if an action is good law,
it must be "strictly in furtherance of the goals of substantive titles." Id.
140. See id. at 25-26.
141. See id. at 26.
142. See Against Comcast, supra note 1, 15.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
of jurisdiction was reasonably ancillary to its Internet Policy
Statement and six separate statutory provisions. 
1 43
a. Internet Policy Statement
The Free Press Petition initiating the Comcast
proceeding argued that jurisdiction existed solely because
Comcast violated the Internet Policy Statement by throttling
Internet traffic, 144 yet the enforceability of the Statement is
somewhat uncertain. Prior to the issuance of the Order,
Comcast argued that statements of policy were not
enforceable because such statements sidestep the substantive
provisions of the statute. 145  The fact that the FCC chose to
issue the Internet Policy Statement seems to imply a lack of
pre-existing and enforceable standards. 146  Assuming the
mere existence of the Statement makes it enforceable as FCC
precedent, Comcast had notice of its policies. 147  The FCC
stated its intent to enforce the Internet Policy Statement
when it issued the Wireline Broadband Order.14
8
Additionally, because the FCC had mentioned that the
blocking or importing of cable modem access may trigger an
intervention, Comcast had reason to know that its practices
were contrary to communications policy. 14  Moreover,
143. See id. 16; supra notes 120-123 regarding principles enumerated in
the Internet Policy Statement.
144. See Petition for Declaratory Ruling of Free Press et al., supra note 49, at
14.
145. See Letter from Kathryn A. Zachem, Vice President, Regulatory Affairs,
Comcast Corporation, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC 2 (July 21, 2008),
available at http://domex.nps.edu/corp/files/govdocsl/754/754636.pdf (noting
that "[tihe declaration of policy ... is not part of the substantive portion of the
statute," and thus no basis for agency action against Comcast).
146. See generally Wireline Facilities, supra note 85.
147. See Against Comcast, supra note 1, 35. This type of assumption,
however, constitutes one of the key concerns for those critical of the FCC's
Order.
148. See id. 13 (citing Wireline Facilities, supra note 85 for its warning that
"[sihould [the FCC] see evidence that providers of telecommunications for
Internet access or IP-enabled services are violating these principles, [it would]
not hesitate to take action to address that conduct"). Comcast did not escape
the Policy Statement by merely delaying applications; the delay was
tantamount to blocking. Id. 44-45.
149. See id. $ 40 (citing 17 F.C.C.R. 4842 79 (2002)). Comcast has steadily
maintained that the Policy Statement did not constitute fair notice as required
to ensure due process since it is not enforceable as law. See Opening Brief for
Petitioner Comcast Corporation, supra note 9, at 40-41. The company has
equated the Statement to a mere press release, arguing that an agency may
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Comcast arguably admitted jurisdiction over its network
management practices in prior litigation before the Northern
District of California.
150
The Supreme Court has held that the FCC may base its
exercise of authority on the policies the Act states, as well as
the regulatory power it confers. 151  Because the Internet
Policy Statement reiterates pre-existing policies from the Act,
the Statement may well be enforceable. 152  If so, the FCC
responded to the Comcast dispute in a manner aligned with
such policy.
b. Statutory Provisions
The Free Press Petition initiating the Comcast inquiry
did not cite any provisions of the Communications Act or any
FCC rules or orders. 153 In fact, prior to issuing the Comcast
Order, the FCC sought public comment only as to whether
degrading P2P traffic violates the Internet Policy
Statement. 5 4  Nonetheless, the FCC cited authority to
regulate Comcast as reasonably ancillary to the furtherance
establish binding policy only through rulemaking policies promulgating
substantive rules or through adjudications constituting binding precedents. See
id. at 22 (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38
(D.C. Cir. 1974)).
150. See Against Comcast, supra note 1, 24.
151. See, e.g., United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
152. For example, the Statement points out that the goals of preserving the
open and vibrant nature of the Internet and encouraging broadband deployment
had been codified in the Act. Appropriate Framework, supra note 117, 2
(citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(b)(1), 706(a) (2006)).
153. See Petition for Declaratory Ruling of Free Press et al., supra note 49, at
i, iii, 3, 14; Letter from Kathryn A. Zachem, Vice President, Regulatory Affairs,
Comcast Corporation, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC 2 (July 10, 2008),
available at
http://www.wired.com/images blogs/threatlevelfiles/comcast response-tofp_au
thorityletterl.pdf. Free Press later shifted its position to rely on statements
set forth in § 230(b) of the Act and § 706(a) of 1996 Act, defending its use of
"short-hand" to urge FCC action. Letter to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC,
from Marvin Ammori, Gen. Counsel, Free Press Attachment 2 2 (June 12,
2008), available at http'//www.freepress.net/files/FP et-al-PetitionEx_
ParteFiling.pdf (claiming that previous references to "enforcing the Policy
Statement" were intended to "save words on a more detailed expression:
'making policy based on announced principles set forth in a Policy Statement by
using adjudication to enforce rights guaranteed to consumers, and which the
FCC must ensure because of obligations imposed on the FCC by the
Communications Act'").
154. Comment Sought on Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding Internet
Management Policies, Public Notice, 23 F.C.C.R. 340, 340 (2008).
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of six other statutory provisions: §§ 1, 201, 256, 257, and
601(4) of the Communications Act, and § 706 of the 1996
Act. 155 While the Comcast Order seems more closely tied to
the goals of some provisions than others, the aggregate
statutory authority and overarching Internet policy are
arguably sufficient to support jurisdiction.
Section 1 directs the FCC to "make available" a rapid and
efficient communication service. 156 Authority reasonably
ancillary to this delegation may exist because prohibiting
unreasonable network discrimination encourages more rapid
and efficient service across the network. 57 Also, exercising
jurisdiction would promote the achievement of "reasonable
charges," because allowing consumer access to an alternative
media source would spark competition and competitive
pricing. 158
The FCC's jurisdiction seems best asserted as ancillary to
§ 201, which makes unlawful any common carrier charge,
practice, classification, or regulation that is unjust or
unreasonable. 159 Though Comcast has not been considered a
common carrier, 160 its tendency to shift costs to common
carrier competitors with whom it interconnects suggests that
regulation may be reasonably ancillary to § 201.161 If this
section is to have any effect in ensuring fair practices among
common carriers, it must reach entities that fall beyond that
classification yet nonetheless impact the market. Because
Comcast's deceptive conduct was contrary to standards of
reasonableness, 162 the FCC arguably invoked its authority
155. Against Comcast, supra note 1, 16. Comcast has nonetheless
responded that the FCC cannot exercise authority ancillary to provisions that
are arguably mere statements of policy. See Opening Brief for Petitioner
Comcast Corporation, supra note 9, at 42-48.
156. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (stating the purposes of the Act).
157. See Against Comcast, supra note 1, 16.
158. See id.
159. 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006).
160. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
161. See Against Comcast, supra note 1, 17.
162. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text regarding Comcast's
practices. See also Against Comcast, supra note 1, at 13066 (statement of
Chairman Kevin J. Martin) (noting that willingness to disclose practices is a
hallmark of reasonableness). While no provision in the Policy Statement
imposes a disclosure requirement, such a requirement might be inferred from
the mandate that providers engage in "reasonable" network management
(which could not have included mimicking another user's computer and covertly
sending a reset packet). See Appropriate Framework, supra note 117, 5
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ancillary to effect the provisions of Title II.
Section 706 of the 1996 Act orders the FCC to encourage
the deployment of advanced telecommunications capability to
all Americans on a reasonable and timely basis.'63 The FCC
claimed ancillary authority based on this section because the
degrading of consumer access limits broadband deployment
and a prohibition on this behavior would increase the
consumer demand for unimpeded access. 16 Even so, by
halting Comcast's network management, the FCC seems to
have gone beyond mere encouragement. Other methods of
encouraging broadband deployment, such as building out
networks (particularly in rural areas) or facilitating market
entry, may better serve this goal. In light of these
alternatives, halting Comcast's practices does not seem
closely related enough to § 706 goals to create reasonably
ancillary jurisdiction.
Under § 256, the FCC may "promote nondiscriminatory
accessibility" of public telecommunications networks to
"ensure the ability of users and information providers to
seamlessly and transparently transmit and receive
information between and across telecommunications
networks." 65  This section allows broad oversight of
interconnectivity and reliability, regardless of the legal
classification of the broadband service. 166 Comcast erected a
barrier that effectively shifted traffic; thus, the FCC acted
reasonably when it halted this practice and implicitly enabled
the public to "seamlessly and transparently transmit and
receive information." 6 ' Logic seems to preclude a finding
that the FCC must regulate part of an interconnected
network but not the whole. Although the shifting effect of
traffic between networks may be an attenuated justification
for invoking § 256, this conclusion follows logically in light of
the growing importance of interconnectivity.
(noting the principles were subject to reasonable network management).
Comcast's behavior also contravened TCP standards promulgated by the
Internet Engineering Task Force by violating expectations that accompany
network connections and general Internet behavior. Id. 45.
163. 47 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
164. See Against Comcast, supra note 1, 18.
165. 47 U.S.C. § 256(a)(B)(2) (2006).
166. See Against Comcast, supra note 1, 19 (citing Wireline Facilities,
supra note 85).
167. See id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 256(a)(2) (2006)).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Under § 257, the FCC must conduct ongoing reviews to
identify and eliminate market barriers for both
telecommunications services and information services. 168
This provision reinforces a national policy of promoting the
"public interest, convenience, and necessity."'69 The FCC
embraced this policy of content neutrality in its Comcast
Order, linking the success of the Internet to its open and
neutral design.1 70  In halting Comcast's discriminatory
practices, the FCC furthered the public interest by assuring
that third parties are able to enter the broadband market and
force competitive pricing. 171
Title VI is, among other purposes, intended to "assure
that cable communications provide and are encouraged to
provide the widest possible diversity of information sources
and services to the public." 72  This directive applies broadly
to "cable communications," including P2P transfers.'73 A
restriction on discriminatory network management facilitates
access to a wider variety of content and a diversity of
information sources and services. It was thus not
unreasonable for the FCC to have found ancillary jurisdiction
under this Title.
Although certain provisions provide more convincing
authority than others, there is a strong basis for regulating
broadband access based on Title I's historic regulation of new
technologies on an "as-needed" basis until such technologies
are formally incorporated into the Act.'74  Broadband
technology falls under this section because of its rapid
technological developments. The text of the Act indicates
168. See id. 20 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 257 (2006)).
169. Id. § 257(b) (stating that the FCC "shall promote the policies and
purposes of this [Act] favoring diversity of media voices, vigorous economic
competition, technological advancement, and promotion of the public interest,
convenience, and necessity").
170. See Against Comcast, supra note 1, $ 20. This is one reason to believe
the principles of net neutrality are in fact codified in some form, albeit on a
piecemeal basis.
171. See id. The FCC is similarly correct to note that contravention of
standard practices through discriminatory conduct erects forced barriers to
entry and warrants action to allow for technological advancement. See id.
172. 47 U.S.C. § 521(4) (2006).
173. Against Comcast, supra note 1, 21. In this instance, the FCC defines
'cable communications" to include "those communications, such as peer-to-peer
transfers, facilitated by broadband Internet access service provided by cable
operators such as Comcast." Id.
174. Barry, supra note 134, at 443.
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congressional intent to empower the FCC in ambiguous cases,
noting an interest in "centralizing authority" and "granting
additional authority." 175 Though Comcast has criticized the
"cobbl[ing] together" of various provisions, 176 a mandate to
protect the "public interest, convenience, and necessity" in the
context of new technology necessitates an aggregated
approach.' 77 Given the vagueness of its statutory charge to
protect the public interest, 78 the FCC can justify many of its
actions on that basis.
Congress may have intended to preserve an Internet
generally "unfettered" by regulation,' 79  but broadband
Internet providers presumably cannot completely escape
government oversight, given the Act's stated purpose of
"preserv[ing] the vibrant and competitive free market."' 0 In
light of clear evidence of Comcast's discriminatory practices, a
failure to act on the part of the FCC might have suggested
disregard for recurring themes in communications policy. '8 1
B. An Invitation for Unguided Regulatory Action
While the FCC likely possessed proper ancillary
authority to issue the Comcast Order, the Commission erred
by adopting too flexible a framework that embraces case-by-
case adjudications and allows for unguided regulatory
175. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
176. Letter from Kathryn A. Zachem, supra note 153, at 3.
177. 47 U.S.C. § 257(b) (2006).
178. See Frederick W. Ford, The Meaning of the "Public Interest, Convenience,
or Necessity,' 5 J. BROADCASTING 205, 205 (1961) (pointing out that an
outstanding attorney once likened the clause to "simply what the commissioners
say it is at the time they render a decision").
179. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2006).
180. Id. Yet Comcast would counter-and has countered-that such mere
expressions of policy do not create binding legal norms. See Opening Brief for
Petitioner Comcast Corporation, supra note 9, at 28. Comcast has specifically
highlighted the FCC's apparent reluctance to rely on §§ 230(b) and 706(a) in
support of its Order. See id. at 29 (noting that the Order "studiously avoided
stating that it enforces Sections 230(b) or 706(a), instead referring repeatedly to
enforcement of'federal policy'").
181. Chairman Kevin Martin noted this potential for setting a poor precedent
by failure to act, as well as its implicit suggestion that network neutrality laws
are needed. See Against Comcast, supra note 1, at 13067 (statement of
Chairman Kevin J. Martin). Yet the Comcast Order in fact does seem to
indicate that such laws are necessary, given the FCC's need to cherry-pick from
various statutory provisions in order to establish jurisdiction and standards for
reasonable network management.
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action.' 2 The FCC vowed to protect lawful Internet access,8 3
yet it has taken no concrete steps to that end. Instead, it has
adopted a "wait-and-see" approach in which it intends only to
address a violation when it becomes a demonstrated threat. I"
This method of regulation may cause corporate second-
guessing and is subject to lengthy judicial review.185
Moreover, boundless adjudication could lead the FCC to
abuse its discretion because authority is seemingly limitless.
Nonetheless, the FCC chose to adjudicate the Comcast
dispute despite the novel questions regarding broadband
Internet, the complex nature of broadband services that
precludes a "one-size-fits-all" approach, and the congressional
directives urging restraint."6 The FCC acknowledged the
possibility that it could later prescribe rules following another
adjudication.'8 7
Despite Comcast's egregious actions, 8  the FCC
refrained from adopting a rigid regulatory framework for
network management practices. This attempt to maintain a
flexible approach, however, may allow further content
blocking.8 9 The FCC stated that because the Internet Policy
Statement empowers customers to "access the lawful Internet
content of their choice, [broadband] providers, consistent with
federal policy, may block transmissions of illegal content or
transmissions that violate copyright law." 9 ° A statement by
former Chairman Martin seemed to further endorse Internet
182. See Speta, supra note 136, at 26-28. Case-by-case adjudication and the
development of facts via an adversarial process create the possibility of delay
and lack of uniformity, which in turn inhibit the development of business
models. Id. at 19. See supra note 55 and accompanying text regarding this
framework.
183. See Wireline Facilities, supra note 85, 96.
184. See id.
185. See Speta, supra note 136, at 22.
186. See Against Comcast, supra note 1, $1 30-32.
187. See id. H 38-40 (citing In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message
Toll Telephone Service, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968)).
188. Numerous experts and organizations have condemned Comcast's
behavior as not only unreasonable, but as harmful and even a form of
censorship. See Against Comcast, supra note 1, 46. Evidence suggests that
Comcast may have interfered with up to seventy-five percent of P2P TCP
connections in certain communities. Id. 42.
189. See Posting of David Kravets to Wired.com,
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/08/analysis-fcc-co/ (Aug. 20, 2008, 12:53
EST).
190. See Against Comcast, supra note 1, 50.
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filtering, gauging the reasonableness of network management
practices based on whether network activity is illegal or
harmful.'91 While such allowances were likely made in good
conscience, they seem an invitation for ISPs to block traffic
based entirely on content. 192  Thus, the FCC's attempt to
resolve network management issues with flexibility may
create a more discriminatory result.
Finally, a network management framework lacking clear
standards for discrimination is likely to lead to subjective and
potentially arbitrary decision making. For instance, the
Comcast framework requires the FCC to consider the
distinction between legal and illegal content when
determining whether a company is blocking or degrading
Internet content in a discriminatory (or willful) manner.' 93
"Discrimination" has been defined as "allowing network-
access providers to treat some traffic or users differently"
than others, '94 and actually occurs quite often.'95 A firm may
discriminate based on several motivations, and the mere act
of preferring one party over another does not necessarily
warrant intervention. 96 Comcast's conduct-which involved
deceptive trade practices197-should clearly be regulated, yet
even this situation involved subjectivity because evidence
191. Against Comcast, supra note 1, at 13070-71 (statement of Chairman
Kevin J. Martin).
192. See Posting of David Kravets, supra note 189 (noting the FCC's
concession that carriers may "act as traffic cops" and block illegal material and
transmissions).
193. For a full explanation of the proposed framework, see Against Comcast,
supra note 1, at 13073-75 (statement of Chairman Kevin J. Martin).
194. See Susan P. Crawford, The Internet and the Project of Communications
Law, 55 UCLA L. REV. 359, 395 (2007).
195. Werbach, supra note 21, at 1278-79 (citing cross-subsidization as an
example of discrimination in the differential treatment of customers).
196. Id. For instance, scarcity and congestion necessarily require some
packets to be dropped. In that instance, discrimination may take the form of a
mere granting of priority to certain users. See Howard A. Shelanski, Network
Neutrality: Regulating with more Questions than Answers, 6 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 23, 35 (2007) (analogizing this situation to a traffic lane reserved
for only certain vehicles at rush hour, but otherwise open to general use). Other
discrimination occurs when a provider hopes to recover operator expenses
directly from users who cause the network to incur higher costs, or when it
realizes that some are willing to pay higher costs for greater access. Id. at 35-
36.
197. See Werbach, supra note 21, at 1278-79 (2007) (noting that such
examples are an exception to the rule against regulation).
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regarding Comcast's behavior was conflicting. 19 Vague
nondiscrimination rules allowing such leeway will fail
because they involve difficult determinations as to whether
discrimination or content is harmful rather than benign. 199 It
is crucial that a regulatory framework include a provision on
discrimination because even the possibility of future
discrimination may lessen incentives for companies to invest
in broadband developments.200
C. The Need for Clear Regulatory Framework to Fill a Gap in
Policy
The lack of a clear congressional mandate, coupled with
the FCC's reluctance to impose additional regulations, has
created a policy gap regarding the provision of broadband
Internet access services. 201 Though the FCC rightly found the
authority to address the Comcast dispute,2 2 other network
management controversies will undoubtedly arise.20 3
Despite the lack of legislation on net neutrality, recent
FCC and congressional proposals suggest broad support for a
clear regulatory policy for broadband Internet access
services.20 4 One proposal, the Internet Freedom Preservation
198. See, e.g., Against Comcast, supra note 1, at 13092 (dissenting statement
of Commissioner Robert M. McDowell) (acknowledging that "the FCC does not
know what Comcast did or did not do" in light of such thin and conflicting
evidence).
199. See Werbach, supra note 21, at 1277.
200. See Douglas A. Hass, The Never-Was-Neutral Net and Why Informed
End Users Can End the Net Neutrality Debate, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1565,
1593 (2007) (citing concerns of Professors Lawrence Lessig and Tim Wu).
201. See Posting of David Sohn to Center for Democracy & Technology.org,
http'//blog.cdt.org/2008/07/16/fcc-enforcement-against-comcast (July 16, 2008).
202. It is fortunate that the FCC entered the dispute, because a failure to act
might have led the FCC down a slippery slope toward endless types of
discrimination by broadband providers. See Against Comcast, supra note 1, at
13067 (statement of Chairman Kevin J. Martin) (noting that "[ilf we aren't
going to stop a company that is looking inside its subscribers' communications.
. . blocking that communication when it uses a particular application regardless
of whether there is congestion on the network, hiding what it is doing by
making consumers think the problem is their own, and lying about it to the
public, what would we stop?").
203. In fact, following the Comcast Order, Free Press asked the FCC to
require U.S. wireless networks to follow the same policy imposed upon Comcast.
See Mark Long, FCC Asked to Apply Open Internet Rule to Skype, NEWSFACTOR
NETwORK, Apr. 3, 2009, httpJ/www.newsfactor.com/news/FCC-Open-Rule-
Sought-for-Skype/story.xhtml?story-id=003000AMCIL3&full skip=1. Free
Press cited AT&T's blocking of the Skype application on Apple iPhones. Id.
204. See infra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
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Act, would have introduced a ban on the blocking and
degradation of lawful content, forbidding firms from requiring
purchase of further services before providing Internet access,
and banning quality of service deals between network
providers and specific content providers. °5 In the fall of
2009, the FCC proposed a set of net neutrality rules
incorporating several of the principles from its 2005 Policy
Statement.206 A bipartisan effort to advance the adoption of
these rules appears to be on the horizon.20 7 To date, however,
efforts to legislate on net neutrality principles have failed,
due in part to opposition from telephone and cable companies
who have argued that the FCC possesses ample authority to
enforce such principles. 28  The Obama administration has
indicated its support for open access and increased broadband
deployment, 20 9 and developments amid economic stimulus
efforts have suggested that, in some form, the net neutrality
debate will continue to smolder.210
Historical precedent indicates an intention to maintain a
relatively deregulatory environment,2 ' yet most of the
205. See Richman, supra note 35, at 17-19 (noting that it would still have
allowed content prioritization so long as it originated from a provider's
network). Other proposed legislation has included the Internet Non-
Discrimination Act of 2006, the Network Neutrality Act of 2006, the
Communications, Consumer's Choice, and Broadband Deployment Act of 2006,
and the Internet Freedom and Nondiscrimination Act of 2006. Id. at 17.
206. See Grant Gross, FCC Chairman Calls for Formal Net Neutrality Rules,
PCWORLD, Sept. 21, 2009,
http:/www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/172312/fcc-chairman-callsfor-f
ormalnetneutrality-rules.html.
207. See Posting of Cecilia Kang to http://voices.washingtonpost.com/
posttech/2009/09/senators-plan bill to advance.html (Sept. 28, 2009, 16:55
EST) (noting Sen. Byron L. Dorgon (D-N.D.) and Sen. Olympia Snowe (R-Maine)
are considering legislation aimed at adopting the FCC's proposed rules).
208. Proposals may also have failed due to concern by investors who would be
directly impacted by network management restrictions. See Grant Gross,
Congress to Push for Net Neutrality Legislation, PCWORLD, Nov. 13, 2008,
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/153827/congress-to-push-forne
t_neutrality-jegislation.html.
209. See The White House.gov, Technology, http://www.whitehouse.gov
issues/technology (last visited Jan. 4, 2010).
210. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which proposes a
multi-billion-dollar allotment for broadband buildouts to underserved and rural
areas, contains a requirement for open network provisions. Roy Mark,
Broadband Buildout Nets Neutrality Debate, EWEEK.COM, Mar. 24, 2009,
http://www.eweek.com/ca/IT-Infrastructure/Broadband-Buildout-Nets-
Neutrality-Debate-671262.
211. See, e.g., Pursuant to Section 706, supra note 33, 133 ("We believe that
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authority indicating a preference for minimal regulation also
expresses the utmost support for competition and widespread
deployment of broadband Internet. 12  Failure to act in the
Comcast matter would have flouted both goals because the
behavior blocked third-party content and would have
facilitated a Comcast monopoly. 1 3
Advocates of the laissez-faire approach to broadband
regulation argue that good infrastructure sets up rules for
a competitive market, then allows the market to
operate without regulation.214 Yet this theory presumes a
prerequisite set of good rules. In reality the market for
broadband is very centralized and duopolistic, with high
barriers to entry,215 so the theory relies too heavily on
network owners and presumes that these entities will do
what is sensible from a social perspective.216  Another
shortcoming of the laissez-faire approach is the ex post
enforcement that occurs when the FCC finds a clear basis for
intrusion into private business. Scholars criticizing such
enforcement have deftly noted that "[t]o say there is no
a minimal regulatory framework will promote competition and thus encourage
investment in advanced telecommunications capability."); Inquiry Concerning
the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans
in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such
Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 15
F.C.C.R. 20913, 246 (2000) ("[Wle believe that competition, not regulation,
holds the key to stimulating further deployment of advanced
telecommunications capability.").
212. See generally In re Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications
Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible
Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14 F.C.C.R. 2398 (1999).
213. See, e.g., Against Comcast, supra note 1, % 9 (discussing the thwarting of
Gnutella upload requests).
214. See Against Comcast, supra note 1, at 13085-87 (dissenting statement
of Commissioner Deborah Taylor Tate) (expressing concern over government
interference). Such a proposition is rooted in the idea that providers should be
given latitude to experiment with a range of models and refrain from
intervention until a particular consumer harm is demonstrated. Yoo, supra
note 22, at 259. Since the "brightest minds" disagree, the U.S. has an interest
in hesitating before adopting regulations that make certain business models
unlawful. See id.
215. See infra notes 219-23 and accompanying text regarding the U.S.
broadband market.
216. See Frischmann & van Schewick, supra note 107, at 390, 400 (noting
that "network providers calculate... private benefits of discrimination against
[third party] providers of complementary products without considering the
resulting [and detrimental] reduction in.. . innovation").
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reason to use a seatbelt because there is always the care of an
emergency room is to miss the extraordinary cost of an ex
post remedy. "217
Moreover, leaving broadband unregulated misses the
overarching goal of the Act-promoting competition.218
Though former Chairman Martin has characterized the U.S.
broadband market as fiercely competitive,219 in reality, there
is little competition.22 ° "More than [ninety-eight] percent of
home broadband users obtain access from either a telephone
company's DSL service or a cable company's cable modem
service. "221 Additionally, "the top ten broadband providers...
control over eighty-three percent of the market for
broadband," and "[olver forty percent of the homes in the
United States have access to no more than one broadband
provider."22 Thus, U.S. broadband access is controlled by
regional cable and telephone companies in a structure that
has prevented "price competition for standalone broadband
access," and has effectively disincentivized interconnection. 223
The FCC's three-to-two split in the Comcast ruling
echoes the public irresolution over principles of
nondiscrimination that, although recognized in various
portions of the Communications Act, 224 are not enshrined in a
clear set of explicit standards. 22  A general deregulatory
approach-based in principles rather than proactive
regulations-has caused the United States to fall behind the
rest of the world in broadband access.226 Japan, which
embraced broadband regulations, has quickly excelled beyond
217. Lemley & Lessig, supra note 18, at 956.
218. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying discussion regarding purposes
of communications law.
219. See Kevin J. Martin, Op-Ed, United States of Broadband, WALL ST. J.,
July 7, 2005, at A12 (noting that "broadband platforms are engaged in fierce
competition .... This competition is leading to broadband providers offering
customers faster and faster connections at lower and lower prices").
220. See Crawford, supra note 194, at 398-99.
221. Id. at 399.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 399-400.
224. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
226. See S. DEREK TURNER, BROADBAND REALITY CHECK II: THE TRUTH
BEHIND AMERICA'S DIGITAL DECLINE 4 (2006),
http'J/www.freepress.net/docs/bbrc2-final.pdf (attributing the successes of other
countries to successful implementation and use of nondiscriminatory, open-
access policies).
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the United States in the provision of superior (and cheaper)
broadband service. 227 Though the United States once pushed
for a similar type of competitive access to telephone lines,
these efforts eventually fizzled.22
Perhaps this is why the FCC found itself in a situation
that required the simultaneous adoption and enforcement of a
new binding legal mandate. Although the Comcast Order
offers guidance, it is insufficient to remove doubt regarding
the discriminatory management of Internet traffic. The
Comcast dispute and the FCC's indication that other
providers have been "cryptic" about their network
management practices may be proof that providers have
engaged in discriminatory conduct.229 In that respect, a
framework that holds providers accountable for disclosure of
network management practices is crucial to averting harm to
consumers. The fact that the FCC's authority in the Comcast
action was so disputed proves the need for a new regulatory
framework for provision of cable modem service.
IV. PROPOSAL
Free Press implored the FCC to regulate broadband
provision based on the FCC's goals of preserving the
Internet's vibrant and competitive free market and
encouraging the widespread deployment of advanced
telecommunications capability. 20 To properly advance these
227. See Pasquale, supra note 34, at 273 (noting that broadband "exploded"
following Japan's decision to compel large phone companies to open wires to
upstart Internet providers). Though the United States once pushed for a
similar type of competitive access to telephone lines, these efforts eventually
fizzled. See Blaine Harden, Japan's Warp-Speed Ride to Internet Future, WASH.
POST, Aug. 29, 2007, at Al.
228. See Harden, supra note 227.
229. See Against Comcast, supra note 1, [ 31. Following the Comcast ruling,
two journalists alleged that Google Inc. had approached ISPs with a proposal to
create a "fast lane" for its own content. Vishesh Kumar & Christopher Rhoads,
Google Wants Its Own Fast Track on the Web, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2008, at Al
(noting that this service would accelerate Google's service for users). Though
Google denied any departure from a pro-net neutrality stance, the allegations
increased public concern regarding anticompetitive behavior. Roy Mark, Net
Neutrality Proponents Blast Google Story, EWEEK.COM, Dec. 15, 2008,
http'//www.eweek.com/c/a/Enterprise-Networking(Net-Neutrality-Proponents-
Blast-Google-Story. In October 2009, the chief executive officers of Google and
Verizon Wireless coauthored a statement advocating a common ground in the
net neutrality debate. Gross, supra note 10.
230. See supra notes 144, 153 and accompanying text regarding Free Press's
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objectives while adjudicating future disputes, regulators and
legislators must elucidate U.S. policy as it relates to
broadband Internet access services. Specifically, either the
FCC or Congress should implement a mandatory disclosure
model for broadband network management practices,
accompanied by enforcement provisions granting the FCC
narrowly drawn authority to regulate toward this end.
A. A Mandatory Disclosure Model
The Comcast dispute presented a unique instance where
a set of established principles could ultimately be codified into
rules.2 31  Even if the Internet Policy Statement provided
Comcast with clear notice of its wrongdoing, the fact that the
FCC declined to fine Comcast for its behavior 232 suggests that
it was unclear whether Comcast "broke the rules" and
whether there existed rules clear enough to be broken.
While the FCC may invoke ancillary jurisdiction to
regulate future network management disputes following the
Comcast Order, it seems preferable to create a policy that
grants the FCC narrowly-drawn authority to regulate
broadband network management. Thus, regulators should
implement an ex ante mandatory disclosure model applicable
to all providers of broadband cable modem service.233 After
all, the FCC found that Comcast exacerbated anticompetitive
harm by failing to disclose its practices.234  Mandatory
disclosure is rooted in the idea that end users are willing to
avoid complex pricing schemes-even if it means paying a
premium for a simpler broadband plan-and that end users
create a tremendous effect on the market by impacting
pricing choices. 235 Even absent other neutrality regulations,
it is important for users to have better information about
claims ofjurisdiction.
231. See Against Comcast, supra note 1, 40 (analogizing to the "widely
respected Carterfone principles").
232. See generally id.
233. This disclosure rule is modeled in part after the disclosure ordered
against Comcast. See id. 54. Following issuance of the Comcast Order, the
Comcast website now displays a prominent link to its disclosures regarding
network management practices. See Comcast.net Terms of Service-Subscriber
Agreement, httpJ/www.comcast.netlterms/subscriber (last visited Jan. 4, 2010).
234. See Against Comcast, supra note 1, 52.
235. See Hass, supra note 200, at 1620-21 (2007) (noting the vociferous and
vocal opposition often expressed amid changing policies).
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broadband services.236
A mandatory disclosure model would require a public
disclosure 237 prior to the provision of broadband service. This
disclosure would indicate how services are affected by various
service agreements and how the provider manages network
congestion. This disclosure must be conspicuous and
sufficiently clear to be reasonably understood by a subscriber
of ordinary intelligence.2 8  It should also detail the
equipment used to manage congestion, the allowable levels of
bandwidth usage, and the procedures to be pursued if those
levels are exceeded. A provider should supplement its
disclosures with any changes to its previously disclosed
practices, prior to the implementation of the changes.
Additionally, following any unilateral interferences with a
subscribers' traffic imposed by a provider, the provider must
disclose to that subscriber the precise practices employed, the
circumstances of their employment, and the protocols that
were affected.
B. An Enforcement Mechanism to Prevent Undisclosed
Discriminatory Impact
One drawback to this type of disclosure principle is that
it does not ensure that consumers or smaller providers are
protected from discriminatory market forces. Thus, this ex
ante disclosure model should be paired with a specific
enforcement provision bringing customer disputes within the
FCC's regulatory authority.239 The provision would prohibit
the undisclosed application of network management practices
so as to impact a subscriber in a content-based or application-
based manner. Where a subscriber alleges that a provider
has violated this prohibition and in so doing caused the
subscriber actual harm, this provision empowers the
subscriber to file a complaint with the FCC.240 If a provider is
236. See id. at 1624.
237. The FCC took this approach with regard to Comcast's behavior, ordering
disclosure of future network management practices. See Against Comcast,
supra note 1, % 54.
238. This standard may also be further tailored to fit the typical subscriber of
a given type of provider.
239. This should be a narrowly drafted regime, by which the FCC's
jurisdiction in such broadband service disputes is confined to the limited issue
of disclosure of discriminatory network management.
240. Such harm may be construed broadly to include intangible consequences
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proven to have actually harmed a subscriber through such
undisclosed discriminatory behavior, the FCC shall order
injunctive relief requiring the provider to suspend its
discriminatory practices. The FCC shall also immediately
issue an order directing the provider to show cause as to why
a permanent cease-and-desist order should not issue against
it. Failure to show cause will result in issuance of a
permanent cease-and-desist order against the provider. A
finding of competition in the cable modem service market,
however, should be dispositive against the orders as described
above. 241
C. Benefits of a Clear Disclosure Model
There are many benefits to this disclosure model. First, a
mandatory disclosure rule enforces a market-driven solution
whereby consumers may compare and contrast competing
practices before choosing a broadband provider, thus
enhancing the competitive free market for broadband.2 42 Ex
ante enforcement of such a rule avoids the delay and costs of
ex post enforcement.24 3 Additionally, this scheme sidesteps
concerns relating to net neutrality and the First
Amendment2 44 because it is content neutral and does not
alter a provider's network management absent a failure to
disclose practices. This scheme preserves the flexibility for
providers to reasonably manage networks. In addition, such
a framework minimizes the cost and burden of regulating a
provider that has made an inadvertent or benign error in its
network management because it affords the opportunity to
such as severe delay (more than an ordinary inability to access requested
Internet content). The harm requirement resembles an antitrust framework in
that it evades the adoption of a per se rule, yet provides for case-by-case
analysis of the specific practices at issue. See Yoo, supra note 22, at 246-47
(speaking in context of the antitrust framework).
241. See generally Shelanski, supra note 196 (noting the importance of
ensuring that regulations imposed in the interim before longer-term structural
solutions will not remain in force as market conditions no longer justify them).
242. See Against Comcast, supra note 1, 52; Hass, supra note 200, at 1634
(acknowledging the importance of informed consumer decisions).
243. This approach retains the FCC's ability to examine the reasonableness
and harm of practices on a case-by-case basis.
244. The First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech. U.S. CONST. amend. I. While net neutrality
laws might enhance speech by facilitating transmission of content, such laws
might arguably compel speech by requiring ISPs to transmit messages. See
Richman, supra note 35, at 20.
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remedy such an error. It also serves the purposes of the Act
because it indirectly re-implements a policy of deregulation
based on the level of competition in the market. Finally, this
proposal does not detract from precedent established by the
Comcast Order and is narrowly-tailored to achieve the goals
of promoting competition and encouraging broadband
deployment.245
If Congress were to proceed beyond this proposal and
attempt formal legislation on net neutrality, it might
encounter the proven difficulty of separating unintended
network performance problems from intentional
anticompetitive discrimination; thus, enforcement could be
costly and imprecise.246 Instead, this scheme represents a
limited step intended to remedy the most egregious network
management practices that are undisclosed to customers (and
thus usually unreasonable).2 47 It is also intended to directly
serve the goals addressed in the Comcast Order: preserving
the Internet's vibrant and competitive free market and
encouraging widespread broadband deployment. 248
Though it is not without flaws,249 this proposal embraces
an alternate construction of the net neutrality debate,
focusing on a level of neutrality necessary to promote the
good (sufficiently neutral practices to spark innovation and
competition) rather than the perfect (identical treatment of
data packets). 25° It remains important that the FCC develop
greater expertise in the area of broadband technology. Until
that time, this model creates a best-possible environment for
innovation that can adapt to ensure fair behavior and
network management.
245. See discussion supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
246. See Barry, supra note 134, at 445-46.
247. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text regarding principles of
broadband management, as subject to a standard of reasonableness.
248. See supra note 116-18 and accompanying text regarding the policy goals
sought to be protected.
249. A mandatory disclosure model adds additional hurdles for broadband
providers. This might dampen investment incentives or discourage innovation
by limiting a provider's ability to offer new services or formats. If implemented
on a broader level, regulatory obligations could restrict broadband deployment.
See Gross, supra note 10 (noting similar arguments by critics of net neutrality
rules).
250. See Werbach, supra note 21, at 1286 (proposing this alternative view of
the network neutrality debate).
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V. CONCLUSION
The Comcast Order was a landmark decision in the
regulation of broadband Internet. The FCC's willingness to
reprimand such a dominant provider signifies a shift in
Internet policy that may or may not continue as the United
States pursues its goal of increased broadband deployment.
At the very least, the economic stimulus package approved by
Congress in early 2009 requires grant recipients to follow the
FCC's challenged net neutrality rules.25' Though the FCC's
October 2009 proposal has not yet been formalized, current
Chairman and Obama appointee Julius Genachowski has
vowed to enforce violations of net neutrality principles.2 2
Given its commitment to ensuring an open Internet, the
FCC rightfully took action to end Comcast's unreasonable
practices despite acting on thin statutory authority. Yet
before future network management issues arise, a clear
regulatory model that preserves the goals acknowledged in
the Comcast Order as well as the currently neutral nature of
the Internet must be developed. Such a model will not only
empower consumers, but will more effectively encourage the
innovation that has long allowed the Internet to flourish.
251. See Mark, supra note 210.
252. See Roy Mark, FCC Chief Vows Net Neutrality Enforcement,
EWEEK.COM, Aug. 25, 2009, http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Government-IT/FCC-
Chief-Vows-Net-Neutrality-Enforcement-363871/. Genachowski is in fact
considered to be the architect of President Obama's Technology and Innovation
Plan, which supports the principles of net neutrality to preserve the benefits of
open competition on the Internet. Id.
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